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 Summary 
On the evening of 4 July 2014, the Honduras-registered oil tanker Moresby 9 was attacked 
by nine pirates, approximately 34 nautical miles off Indonesia’s Anambas islands. The 
pirates forced the chief officer to navigate the vessel, while the rest of the crew was tied up 
and locked into the engine control room. The Moresby 9 was then sailed to an unknown 
location, where part of the cargo of marine gas oil was transferred to a second tanker. After 
the transfer, the pirates left the ship and the shipowner was able to re-establish contact with 
his vessel. This was the second attack on the Moresby 9 in two years, and the seventh 
hijacking of a tanker in Southeast Asia since April 2014 (ReCAAP 2014: n.p.). Indeed, the 
number of reported attacks on tankers and other ships in Southeast Asia is on the rise, with 
data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) showing that Southeast Asia was the 
most pirate-prone region in 2013. The publication of the 2013 IMB statistics and the attacks 
on tankers put piracy in Southeast Asia back in the news – ten years after the last piracy 
boom in Southeast Asia. 
This report takes a close look at current pirate attacks in insular Southeast Asia – 
especially Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines – to provide a better 
understanding of contemporary piracy and maritime raids in this region. After critically 
reviewing piracy statistics and other factors, the report examines the nature of attacks 
conducted in Southeast Asia and identifies recent piracy trends and hotspots. The report 
also discusses responses to piracy by regional and international state and non-state actors. It 
will be argued that tailored responses to specific attacks as well as efforts to address the root 
causes of piracy are needed to (1) ensure that piracy does not worsen, (2) protect future 
victims and (3) guarantee the safety of the region’s sea lines of communication. 
Contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia first caused international concern between the 
1990s and the mid-2000s, when the region emerged as ‘the’ international piracy hotspot. 
The first part of the report provides an overview of piracy and anti-piracy measures in 
Southeast Asia during this period. This will allow the identification of changes and 
continuities in regional contemporary piracy and anti-piracy efforts. Between the 1990s and 
mid-2000s, the IMB data shows that Indonesian waters were particularly affected by piracy, 
but it was the rise in reported incidents in the strategically important Malacca Strait that 
caused international concern. Not reflected in the IMB statistics were attacks in the Sulu Sea 
(the waters between Sabah, Malaysia and the southern Philippines), where primarily small 
vessels such as fishing boats were targeted by often violent pirates. In this area, maritime 
raids also occurred, including the abduction of foreign tourists and resort workers from the 
Malaysian island of Sipadan by the Abu Sayyaf.  
Most of the attacks in Southeast Asia at the time were simple hit-and-run robberies 
conducted by opportunistic pirates. Rarer were hijackings and other serious and, when they 
occurred, often violent incidents perpetrated by organised crime syndicates. Opportunistic 
pirates and those hired by syndicates to conduct pirate attacks often came from areas where 
poverty was rife and alternative income hard to find, especially in the wake of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis. Impoverished fishers, for example, took ‘employment’ as pirates or 
conducted opportunistic attacks to supplement their income because their fishing grounds 
 
 were overfished or destroyed. In addition to these pirates, members of radical politically 
motivated groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and corrupt (members of) 
local law enforcement agencies were also involved in attacks.  
The rising number of attacks in this period led to the establishment of organisations and 
the initiation of (cooperative) anti-piracy measures that have shaped the fight against piracy 
ever since. These include the Malacca Straits Patrol Network and the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). 
However, cooperation often remained limited due to concerns about sovereignty. In 
addition, no specific efforts were made to address the underlying causes that motivated 
people to become pirates – including poverty in coastal communities and overfishing – or 
to fight other enabling factors such as corruption. However, the efforts to combat piracy in 
the mid-2000s showed some localized effect, particularly in the Malacca Strait where the 
number of reported attacks declined. With this decline and the rise of Somali piracy from 
2008 onwards, Southeast Asian piracy was all but forgotten.  
International attention only refocused on Southeast Asia after the publication of the 
2013 IMB piracy data which showed that the region was once again the area with the 
highest number of reported incidents. A critical look at these piracy statistics and related 
factors is necessary to understand the threat of contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia. 
Noticeable is the drop in reported attacks in the Malacca Strait, which can at least in part be 
explained by a reluctance of victims to report minor incidents. Shipowners fear higher 
insurance rates if too many incidents are reported and also believe that local authorities are 
themselves responsible for attacks in the Malacca Strait and nearby waters. Furthermore, as 
reflected in the statistics, pirates in the area have moved their operations from the more 
heavily patrolled Malacca Strait to the Singapore Strait and the southern South China Sea. 
In these waters, recent piracy trends can be identified, including an increase in attacks on 
tugs and barges and the short-term hijacking of tankers to steal the cargo. In some cases the 
crew or shipowners of the targeted tankers collude with the pirates, who buy the oil from 
the crew/shipowner and sell it on the black market. 
According to the IMB’s piracy statistics, Indonesia is today the most pirate-prone 
country in the world. A close look at the nature of attacks in Indonesia, however, shows that 
the number of reported incidents overstates the threat of piracy. The vast majority of attacks 
recorded in Indonesia are minor thefts conducted while vessels are at berth or are anchored. 
Piracy in Indonesia is therefore largely a problem of port security, and should be regarded 
as a very different phenomenon from piracy in places such as Somalia. In contrast to 
Indonesia, piracy data fail to reflect the danger of piracy in the Sulu Sea due to incidents not 
being reported. In this area, violent attacks on smaller vessels continue unabated, and, after 
ten years of calm, maritime raids are again a concern. These raids have economic and 
political repercussions and contribute to instability in an already volatile environment.  
Overall, there was little change in the nature of piracy in Southeast Asia compared to 
piracy in the late 1990s to mid-2000s. The motivation of pirates has also not changed, with 
poverty, overfishing and unemployment still persistent in some coastal communities. 
Indeed, some of the ‘older’ pirates who tried to secure a legal income have even returned to 
piracy in recent years. 
II 
 However, the nature of piracy clearly differs between the three Southeast Asian hotspots, 
and all attacks in this region are noticeably different from the hijackings conducted by 
Somali pirates. The deployment of warships from around the world to combat piracy or the 
employment of armed private security guards on ships as is done in the wider Gulf of Aden 
area are therefore not necessary in Southeast Asia. In this region, tailored responses to 
specific types of attacks as well as broader approaches to address the root causes of piracy 
are needed.  
To successfully implement tailored responses, government and non-state actors need to 
increase their efforts and work together. Shipowners, for example, could ensure that their 
crews follow appropriate safety and security procedures and that their vessels are 
sufficiently protected, with specific efforts made to protect vulnerable boats such as tugs and 
barges, as suggested by organizations such as ReCAAP. Governments could further 
improve response time to attacks and initiate more meaningful cooperation between 
maritime agencies from different countries. To deter attacks on tankers, in which oil is 
stolen and sold on Southeast Asia’s booming black market, steps need to be taken to curtail 
oil smuggling. In Indonesia, where most attacks take place while vessels are at berth or 
anchor, port security needs to be improved. Here, the problem is generally not a lack of 
security personnel but instead a lack of cooperation between different security providers. 
Moreover, some personnel hired to secure ports are involved in illegal activities themselves. 
In the Sulu Sea area, the ongoing conflict in the southern Philippines facilitates piracy and 
maritime raids, and needs to be addressed. 
Equally important are initiatives to address the root causes of piracy, which include 
poverty, illegal/overfishing, lax maritime regulations and corruption of law enforcement 
agencies. Here, governments and non-state actors from outside the region could contribute 
by, for example, supporting efforts to eliminate poverty or create alternative employment 
opportunities in coastal areas. Some of the broader initiatives that have been implemented 
to address the root causes of Somali piracy could provide ideas. Governments from within 
and beyond Southeast Asia could also ensure that vessels under their flag meet 
comprehensive safety and security standards; that crew members are sufficiently paid and 
their working conditions are appropriate; and that the crew knows how to respond to pirate 
attacks. For these efforts to be successful, the shipping and fishing industries need to 
support them. 
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 1. Introduction 
On the evening of 14 June 2014, seven pirates in three speedboats attacked the Honduras-
registered tanker Ai Maru in the South China Sea. Armed with guns and knives, the pirates 
climbed on board and tied and locked up the crew. They destroyed the ship’s 
communication equipment and siphoned off approximately 700,000 liters of marine gas oil. 
While the pirates were still on board, the Singaporean, Malaysian and Indonesian 
authorities were alerted about the attack and vessels from all three countries were deployed 
to rescue the tanker. Upon seeing the approaching navy vessels, the pirates abandoned the 
attack and fled, leaving the crew unharmed. The attack on the Ai Maru was not an isolated 
incident: at least six other attacks on small tankers in which the cargo was stolen were 
reported in Southeast Asia between April and July 2014 (ICC 2014a: n.p.; ReCAPP 2014: 
n.p.; Rahmat 2014: n.p.). Indeed, the number of reported attacks on tankers and other ships 
in Southeast Asia is on the rise, with data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
showing that Southeast Asia was the most pirate-prone region in 2013. The publication of 
the 2013 IMB statistics and the attacks on the tankers put piracy in Southeast Asia back in 
the news – ten years after the last piracy boom in Southeast Asia. 
This report takes a close look at current pirate attacks in insular Southeast Asia – 
especially Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines – to provide a better 
understanding of contemporary piracy and maritime raids in this region. After critically 
reviewing piracy statistics and related factors, the report examines the nature of attacks 
conducted in Southeast Asia, and identifies recent piracy trends and hotspots. The report 
also discusses responses to piracy by regional and international state and non-state actors. It 
will be argued that tailored responses to specific attacks and efforts to address the root 
causes of piracy are needed to (1) ensure that piracy does not worsen, (2) protect future 
victims and (3) guarantee the safety of the region’s sea lines of communication. 
The first part of this report starts with a brief discussion of piracy as a security threat and 
the definition of piracy used here. It then offers an overview of Southeast Asian piracy 
between the 1990s and the mid-2000s, when contemporary pirate attacks in this region first 
caused international concern. This period is important because Southeast Asia was at the 
time the most pirate-prone region in the world, and the rising number of attacks led to the 
establishment of organisations and the initiation of cooperative anti-piracy measures that 
have shaped the fight against piracy ever since. The second part discusses piracy in 
Southeast Asia in the past decade. Particular attention is paid to new trends in pirate 
activities and the different nature of attacks in current regional piracy hotspots, including 
Indonesian waters, the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the South China Sea and the Sulu 
Sea. The final part suggests that tailored responses to specific types of attacks as well as 
broader approaches to address the root causes of piracy are needed. The potential roles of 
Southeast Asian governments, governments from beyond the region, and non-state actors 
in the fight against piracy are highlighted in this discussion. 
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2. Contemporary Piracy in Southeast Asia until the Mid-2000s1 
2.1 Piracy as a Security Threat 
Piracy has a long history and has re-emerged as a security threat in the contemporary 
period. Southeast Asian waters as well as the waters off Somalia and Nigeria are particularly 
affected by contemporary piracy. Piracy is both a symptom and a reflection of a number of 
geo-political and socio-economic problems and security concerns, including declining fish 
stocks, the lack of state control over national territory, problems in relations and 
cooperation between countries, and the existence of radical politically motivated groups and 
organised crime networks. Piracy is a concern for the countries affected because they can no 
longer be considered safe places for trade, and piracy demonstrates that local governments 
are not able to protect their ports and waters. Furthermore, pirate attacks can lead to ship 
accidents as the pirates sometimes leave the bridge unmanned during an attack or take over 
the navigation themselves. This can result in accidents such as groundings or collisions with 
other vessels, especially when attacks occur in a congested waterway such as the Malacca 
Strait. Such accidents can have devastating consequences for the crew as well as for the 
environment and people living ashore, particularly if a tanker is involved. 
However, for a variety of reasons, piracy is much more than a local problem. To begin 
with, pirates attack ships registered and owned in countries around the world. Those 
financially hurt by attacks are therefore mostly ship- and cargo-owners (and insurance 
companies) based outside piracy hotspots. Furthermore, the immediate victims, the crew on 
board targeted vessels, consist usually of seafarers from different countries. Pirate attacks 
can be violent in nature, with assaults and injuries, killings, and hostage-taking of crew 
occurring in all piracy hotspots. Such attacks pose a direct threat to the welfare and lives of 
seafarers, and can be a traumatic experience for the victims. Since mariners live on board a 
vessel for prolonged periods of time, an attack can be perceived not only as a raid upon a 
work place, but also as an invasion of their ‘home’. Out at sea, the victims usually have to 
face the attackers alone and are forced to defend themselves by whatever means possible.  
Beyond the actual victims, pirates pose a threat to the safety and security of international 
shipping lanes. Eighty per cent of global merchandise trade by volume today is carried on 
ships, and the timely and safe transport of these goods is the foundation of the global 
economy (UNCTAD 2013: XI). Piracy is therefore an international security concern, or in 
other words, a problem that is not confined to the countries and waters where actual attacks 
occur. Governments from around the world, but especially those of established shipping 
nations such as Germany, should therefore take an interest in combatting piracy.  
1  This part is largely a summary of the author’s book Oceans of Crime (Liss 2011). 
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2.2 Definition of Contemporary Piracy 
In the 1980s, the IMB began the first systematic collection and publication of reports of 
pirate attacks worldwide. Until the recent spate of pirate attacks off Somalia, the IMB 
included in its definition of piracy any “act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit 
theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of 
that act” (ICC 1998: 2). Today, the IMB and many other international institutions draw a 
distinction between piracy and armed robbery against ships. For the definition of piracy, 
Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is used, and 
armed robbery against ships is defined in accordance with the Code of Practice for the 
Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships of the International 
Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.1025 (26). According to these definitions, 
pirate attacks occur on the high seas, while armed robbery against ships are attacks 
committed “within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea”. Both 
include “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends […] against another ship […], or against persons or property on board such 
ship” (ICC 2013: 3). This distinction is also made by the Regional Cooperation Agreement 
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) which came 
into force in 2006. Along with the IMB, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre currently 
provides the most comprehensive piracy data for the Southeast Asian region.2  
These definitions of contemporary piracy and armed robbery against ships only include 
attacks that target vessels or the crew on board, and only those incidents that are committed 
for private as opposed to political ends. While these limitations are generally useful, attacks 
discussed in this report also include incidents that may, at least in part, be politically 
motivated as well as raids against towns and offshore businesses, as long as the perpetrators 
use boats to conduct the attacks. This broader scope is used to accommodate and reflect the 
special nature of some attacks conducted in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Sulu Sea – 
the waters between Sabah, east Malaysia and the southern Philippines. In this area, attacks 
on villages and offshore businesses by maritime raiders still occur, and the distinction 
between political and private motivations is often blurred. Furthermore, in this report, the 
distinction between piracy and armed robbery against ships is not made, because older 
statistics from the 1990s to mid-2000s are also relied upon, and in these the location of 
attacks is not always clear. However, the location of attacks is discussed whenever possible 
and deemed useful. 
2  ReCAAP will be discussed in more detail later.  
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2.3 The Late-1990s to the Mid-2000s 
In the contemporary period, Southeast Asia first became a hotspot for pirate attacks in the 
mid-1970s, when Vietnamese refugees suffered horrendously at the hands of Thai pirates.3 
The attacks on the Vietnamese Boat People in the Gulf of Thailand were exceptionally cruel 
and violent and often involved brutal killings, hostage-taking, torture, and the rape of 
women and children. Their suffering was for a long time largely ignored, but the sheer 
number of Vietnamese refugees arriving in neighbouring Southeast Asian countries, as well 
as reports of the brutal attacks, eventually forced local and international governments and 
organisations to address the problem – and attacks subsided between the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (Boulanger 1989; Eklöf 2006: 17-34).4 Despite these attacks, it was not until the 
late 1990s that contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia emerged as a serious international 
security concern. At this time, the increasing number of attacks and the serious nature of 
some incidents triggered international concern about the safety of international shipping in 
the region’s waters and led to the establishment of organisations and the initiation of 
cooperative measures that have shaped the fight against piracy ever since. This part of the 
report will provide an overview of the most pirate-infested waters in Southeast Asia between 
the 1990s and mid-2000s, before the different types of pirates active in the region at the time 
are discussed.  
Between the 1990s and the mid-2000s, Southeast Asian pirates targeted merchant ships 
of any type, nationality or size – except for very large vessels and ships with a high freeboard 
(which makes it more difficult to climb on board). Smaller, slow moving merchant ships 
with a low freeboard were generally preferred targets of pirates, who used small speed boats 
or fishing vessels to approach their targets. Within Southeast Asia, not all waters were 
equally affected by piracy, and so-called piracy-hotspots shifted to different water areas over 
time. The IMB piracy data presented in Table 1 show the number of reported attacks 
worldwide, in Southeast Asia, and in individual Southeast Asian countries. These data, 
however, have to be taken with a pinch of salt. As the IMB itself acknowledged, only an 
estimated fifty per cent of attacks were reported to the IMB at the time. The number of 
unreported incidents was most probably even higher when attacks on fishing boats are also 
taken into account, as such attacks rarely found their way into these statistics.5  
Between 1990 and 1992, the waters between the Malacca and Singapore Straits have been 
identified as the most pirate prone, but after the initiation of coordinated anti-piracy patrols 
3  The refugees carried small valuable items that the pirates took. However, many boats were attacked more 
than once and with no valuables left, the pirates targeted the refugees in subsequent attacks.    
4  It has been suggested that the Thai pirates were able to operate virtually unhindered for a long time be-
cause the Thai authorities turned a blind eye to the fate of the Vietnamese refugees because of economic 
imperatives, political rivalry, and racial animosity (Boulanger 1989: 87-88; Cerquone 1984: 15). 
5  One option for collecting more accurate information about piracy is to conduct fieldwork to gather ac-
counts of pirate incidents from victims and/or perpetrators. For a discussion of the value, challenges and 
problems of such fieldwork see: Liss (2013).  
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in this area, the focus of piracy shifted to the South China Sea, where between 1993 and 
1995 a high proportion of reported attacks took place (see Table 1). Particularly affected 
were the territorial waters of Hong Kong and Macau and the so-called HLH “terror-
triangle”, encompassing the waters between Hong Kong, Luzon in the Philippines, and the 
Chinese island of Hainan. (Rogue) elements of Chinese customs and other maritime law 
enforcement agencies were believed to be involved in the incidents, and the Chinese 
government eventually tightened control over personnel of the agencies under suspicion 
(Chalk 2000: 68-71).  
As a result, pirate attacks in Chinese waters ceased by the mid-1990s, but China once 
again became the focus of international concern when in the late 1990s a rising number of 
vessels hijacked in Southeast Asia were found in Chinese ports. Initially, the alleged foreign 
pirates were simply repatriated, but as international criticism rose, the Chinese government 
once again tightened its grip and began to bring perpetrators to trial. The most widely 
publicised of these trials was arguably that of the hijackers of the bulk carrier Cheung Son. 
The pirates were found guilty in December 1999 and received severe penalties under the 
law, including thirteen death sentences (Stewart 2002: 419). As a result, Chinese ports 
became less attractive for pirates and lost some of their appeal as a place of business 
involving hijacked vessels.  
Table 1: Location of actual and attempted* attacks, 1993-2006  
 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 
South China Sea 31 6 3 2 6 5 3 9 4 - 2 8 6 1 
HLH Area 27 12 7 4 1 - - - - - - - - - 
China/HK Macau 1 6 31 9 5 2 - 2 - - 1 3 4 1 
Indonesia 10 22 33 57 47 60 115 119 91 103 121 93 79 50 
Malaysia - 4 5 5 4 10 18 21 19 14 5 9 3 10 
Thailand - - 4 16 17 2 5 8 8 5 2 4 1 1 
Philippines - 5 24 39 16 15 6 9 8 10 12 4 - 6 
Malacca Straits 5 3 2 3  1 2 75 17 16 28 37 12 11 
Singapore Straits - 3 2 2 5 1 14 5 7 5 2 8 7 5 
Southeast Asia**  15 37 70 122 89 89 160 237 150 153 170 155 102 83 
Worldwide 103 90 188 228 247 202 300 469 335 370 445 329 276 239 
Source: ICC, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual Reports 1992-2006.  
*Attempted attacks include: attempted attacks, attempted boardings and vessels fired upon. 
**Southeast Asia includes here: Indonesia, Malaysia, Malacca Straits, Philippines, Singapore Straits, 
and Thailand. 
Around the mid-1990s, a higher incidence of attacks was reported in the Philippines (24 in 
1995, 39 in 1996) and Thailand (16 incidents in 1996 and 17 in 1997), but these numbers 
were overshadowed by the rise of reported attacks in Indonesia. From the mid-1990s, as 
Suharto’s New Order regime unravelled, Indonesian waters were identified as the most 
pirate-infested in Southeast Asia. With more than 17,000 islands distributed over 1.9 
million square kilometres, combatting piracy in Indonesian is not an easy task. Most of the 
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reported incidents in Indonesia were minor thefts, often conducted in ports. However, the 
increase of reported attacks in the Malacca Strait,6 which started with a jump from two 
actual and attempted reported attacks in the area in 1999 to 75 the following year, received 
the most international attention (Table 1). In 2001, the number dropped again to 17. In 
2002, 16 incidents were reported, 28 in 2003, 37 in 2004, 12 in 2005 and 11 in 2006. The 
attacks in this area caused concern because of the strategic importance of the strait, which is 
one of the busiest waterways in the world. More than 60,000 vessels over 300 gross tons 
passed through the area annually, including a large number of tankers carrying oil from the 
Middle East to China, Japan, and other destinations (Stehr 2004: 58-9). Unfounded 
speculation that terrorists may have been colluding with pirates in the Malacca Strait and 
accusations that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM – Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), or rogue 
members of the group, were responsible for some attacks, added conspiratorial overtones.  
In addition, an unknown number of unreported attacks on fishing boats occurred in the 
Malacca Strait at the time. Fishers are often reluctant to report incidents either because (1) 
they do not think the authorities will assist them, (2) they know that the authorities are 
themselves responsible for attacks or (3) the fishers were targeted while fishing illegally. 
Interviews by the author in Hutan Melintang, a fishing village on the Malaysian side of the 
Malacca Strait, for example, revealed that local fishers suffered serious attacks once or twice 
per month between 2003 and 2005, when the interviews were conducted. These incidents 
included hijackings of fishing boats and taking fishers hostage for ransom. The IMB 
recorded twenty-eight actual and attempted pirate attacks in the entire Malacca Strait in 
2003, thirty-seven in 2004, and twelve in 2005. Including the attacks on the fishing vessels 
from Hutan Melintang alone would have significantly altered these numbers, adding 
between one or two dozen additional attacks per year.  
Similarly underrepresented in the IMB reports are attacks on fishing vessels in other 
areas. Attacks on fishing boats were particularly common in the waters of the Sulu Sea. The 
perpetrators active in these waters were predominantly from the southern Philippines and 
often carried firearms. They targeted fishing boats and other small ships, such as vessels 
used for inter-island trade or smuggling. Attacks in the Sulu Sea were characterised by a 
high level of violence, as exemplified in an incident that occurred in the late 1990s. In this 
incident, three fishermen were shot dead in the strait between Basilan and Zamboanga 
when armed pirates in a motorboat approached their vessel and opened fire. The pirates 
then stole the fishing boat’s engine and fishing gear and fled (Associated Press Newswire 
1999: n.p.). Piracy in this area is shaped by local socio-political conditions, especially the 
ongoing conflict in the southern Philippines.  
The conflict has a long history, and in the early 1970s, broad-based separatist 
movements began to emerge in the southern Philippines as a result of the ongoing political, 
6  The attacks in the Malacca and Singapore Straits listed in the IMB are in addition to attacks listed for 
individual countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore). Each attack is therefore only included once in the 
IMB’s statistics.   
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social, and economic marginalisation of the Muslim population of Mindanao and Sulu. The 
first major group to emerge was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1971. The 
initial aim of the group was to establish a separate Moro homeland and preserve Islamic and 
indigenous culture (Che Man 1998: 87; McKenna 1998: 163-4). In 1984, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) split from the MNLF, emphasising the ideological “importance of 
Islamic renewal as part of the struggle for (Muslim) self-determination” (Conciliation 
Resources 1999: n.p.). Guerrilla warfare was the predominant pattern of armed struggle 
used by the MNLF and the MILF, with their troops controlling parts of the countryside and 
establishing fixed bases in the southern Philippines. Despite the violence between the 
separatist groups and government forces, both the MNLF and the MILF engaged in 
negotiations with the Philippine government, and the MNLF signed a peace deal in 1996. In 
addition to the MNLF and MILF, new, more radical groups also emerged in the southern 
Philippines, most notably the Abu Sayyaf, which was founded in the early 1990s by the 
former MNLF member Abdurajak Janjalani. Since the early 1990s, this group has been 
responsible for a spate of attacks and robberies in the southern Philippines, including 
bombings, extortion, village raids, attacks on military posts and kidnappings. Due to the 
conflict, weapons were easily accessible and violence was prevalent. The conflict in the 
southern Philippines was also closely linked to maritime raids in the area, particularly the 
kidnapping of tourists and resort workers from the Malaysian resort island of Sipadan by 
the Abu Sayyaf in 2000. 
2.4 The Pirates 
Between the 1990s and the mid-2000s, most pirate attacks on merchant vessels in Southeast 
Asia were simple “hit-and-run robberies”, conducted at sea, on anchorages or in ports. In 
these incidents, pirates slipped up to the targeted ship, often under cover of darkness, and 
took anything of value before leaving the vessel. Common sea robbers were largely 
responsible for these incidents. They were usually groups of men who knew each other and 
who kept the booty for themselves, with the exception of bribes paid to authorities and 
other outsiders to ensure their silence or cooperation. The attacks required little 
organisation or planning and often lasted no longer then fifteen to thirty minutes. Violence 
was restricted to incidents in which they had to confront the victims directly, which the 
perpetrators often tried to avoid. However, these common sea robbers also attacked smaller 
vessels, especially fishing boats, and in these incidents they invariably had to confront their 
victims. Such attacks were consequently more violent in nature.  
Less common were more serious attacks, such as hijackings of merchant vessels. 
Hijackings included extended seizures in which a vessel and its crew were held hostage for a 
limited time and sought-after cargo, such as oil, was stolen. In other cases, the entire vessel 
was stolen by pirates, given a new identity and used for trade again as a so-called “phantom 
ship” (ICC 1998: 3, 7). These attacks were characterised by a high degree of organisation 
and required detailed planning and upfront capital. Organised pirate gangs – or syndicates 
– were to blame for such incidents. According to Eric Ellen, the former head of the IMB, 
Chinese triads were primarily responsible for these types of attack in East and Southeast 
Asia (Stewart 2002: 189-90). To conduct an attack, organisers and financiers within 
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syndicates hired pirates and these actual perpetrators included at least some men with 
maritime skills, such as fishers or ship engineers. The hijackings and extended seizures 
conducted by these hired pirates were often violent in nature, and occasionally entire crews 
were killed. All crew on board the Japanese owned freighter Tenyu, for example, are 
believed to have been killed by pirates. The vessel disappeared in September 1998 shortly 
after leaving the port of Kuala Tanjung (on the Indonesian side of the Malacca Strait), but 
was found three months later in China, with a new crew on board. The fate of the original 
crew remains unknown and the Chinese authorities released the “crew/pirates”, claiming 
that there was insufficient evidence to convict them (Liss 2011: 45, 192). Organized pirate 
gangs also targeted fishing boats, and in areas such as the Malacca Strait, held crew 
members and/or boats hostage for ransom (Liss 2011: 71-88).  
The driving factor behind people involved in crime, whether poor or well off, is the 
desire for money, needed to either survive or prosper in a capitalist world. Both 
opportunistic pirates and organised gangs were motivated by profit. Financiers of attacks, 
for example, aimed to increase their existing capital, while the pirates hired by organised 
pirate gangs and opportunistic pirates often wanted to make a living. Becoming a pirate was 
indeed often not a first choice because it was, and still is, dangerous. It required the 
perpetrators to go out at night in a small boat, approach a large merchant ship, climb on 
board and face the crew (see Frécon 2005: 10). Opportunistic pirates and those hired by 
organised crime gangs therefore often came from areas where poverty was rife and 
alternative income hard to find, especially in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
One prominent example are impoverished fishers who took “employment” as pirates or 
engaged in opportunistic piracy because their fishing grounds were overfished or destroyed 
by the use of illegal fishing methods such as bomb fishing. Overfishing and illegal fishing 
are serious concerns in Southeast Asia, with waters such as the Malacca Strait and  
Indonesian Riau Archipelago, just south of Singapore, especially affected. For subsistence 
and artisan fishers, overfishing is of particular concern, as they rely directly on their catch to 
feed their families and on the sale of additional fish caught for their livelihood. Piracy is a 
choice for fishers because they have the necessary maritime skills, local knowledge of the 
area, and the required equipment, including boats and long knives (parangs). In certain 
areas, such as the southern Philippines, some also bear firearms. 
Some desperate or opportunistic fishers (as well as other people employed at sea, such as 
taxi boat drivers who want or need additional income) turned to piracy and conducted hit-
and-run attacks. They targeted other fishing vessels, yachts, or any other small to medium 
sized ships, including merchant vessels, passing through waters near their communities or 
in nearby ports. Other fishers were recruited by organised crime syndicates and were paid a 
fixed amount for their services. An example is the attack on a buoy tender in June 2001 near 
Karimun Island (Riau Archipelago, Indonesia, south of Singapore), in which one pirate was 
captured by the crew. Investigations later established that the pirate-leaders were based on 
Batam, Riau Archipelago, and that they recruited eight struggling fishers from Karimun 
Island as pirates. The waters surrounding Karimun Island are overfished, the marine 
habitats destroyed by bomb and cyanide fishing, and other sources of income difficult to 
find (Yamada 2004: n.p.; Osseweijer 2004: n.p.).  
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In addition to “ordinary” pirates, such as common sea robbers or syndicates, members 
of radical politically motivated groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines and the GAM, were also suspected to 
be responsible for attacks. (Members of) government forces were also involved either by 
committing attacks themselves or by accepting payments from pirates in exchange for 
turning a blind eye to the pirates’ activities (Liss 2011: 220-43). In Sabah, for example, a 
number of officers from the marine police were involved in sea robberies targeting small 
fishing vessels and other small craft (Liss 2011: 275-302). Observers such as Eric Ellen also 
believed that the Indonesian Navy was involved, including high ranking officers, and that 
navy boats were used as motherships for attacks (Stewart 2002: 157). Furthermore, 
Indonesian and Malaysian authorities have captured pirates who were identified as 
members of the Indonesian military. In January 2006, for example, Indonesian navy 
officials arrested a gang of five pirates that had been operating for several years, among 
them a low ranking member of the Indonesian military stationed in Aceh (Gunawan 2006: 
n.p.; Author’s Interview).7 In addition to direct involvement, piracy was also facilitated by 
corruption of officials in Southeast Asian countries, who received a cut of the proceeds from 
pirates, or collected protection money from potential victims. Fishers on the Malaysian side 
of the Malacca Strait, for example, paid “protection” money to Indonesian authorities, while 
fishers in Sabah paid local authorities to prevent attacks on their ships (see Liss 2011: 275-
302).  
2.5 Combatting Piracy – A Success Story? 
In the early 2000s, pirate attacks on merchant ships in Southeast Asia began to cause 
international concern, which centered almost entirely on attacks in the strategically 
important Malacca Strait. The concern was sparked by a sudden rise in the number of 
reported attacks, jumping from two incidents in 1999 to 75 in 2000 (see Table 1). While the 
number of attacks declined again in 2001, with only 17 reported incidents, the numbers 
remained comparatively high until 2004, with 16 attacks reported in 2002, 28 in 2003 and 37 
in 2004. The serious nature of some of the incidents, which included several hijackings of 
merchant ships, and the fear of possible collusion between pirates and terrorists added to 
the concern. However, even at the height of attacks in the Malacca Strait, piracy remained 
only one of many, often more pressing security concerns for regional governments. The 
number of pirate attacks, for example, paled in comparison with the number of robberies 
and crimes committed on land. Furthermore, other security threats such as territorial 
disputes, illegal fishing and the operations of radical politically motivated groups were 
considered more pressing security issues. Yet, as international concern about the safety of 
Southeast Asian sea-lanes rose, regional governments were put under pressure to 
implement countermeasures or to accept help from outside the region to combat piracy. 
7  Interview by author with a high-ranking police officer, July 2004, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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As a result, anti-piracy measures, consisting largely of more and better coordinated naval 
patrols, were introduced in different hotspots in Southeast Asia, such as the Sulu Sea (Daily 
Express 2005: n.p.). Southeast Asian countries also strengthened their naval forces, 
established new naval agencies such as coast guards, and set up coordination agencies 
(including the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency which became operational in 
2005) to enhance cooperation between different agencies responsible for combatting piracy 
and other maritime security threats within a country.  
Most efforts to combat piracy, however, focused on the Malacca Strait. To secure 
shipping in this strategic waterway, countries such as Japan and the United States offered 
assistance, ranging from offers to send naval vessels to patrol the strait to more indirect 
foreign assistance in the form of training for regional maritime agencies or donations of 
funds or military hardware to local government agencies. Indirect assistance has generally 
been accepted, and consisted mostly of donations of funds and hardware, as well as some 
training of local forces.  Direct ‘foreign’ involvement, on the other hand, has been viewed 
with suspicion in the region and has been refused. The littoral states Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia therefore took it largely into their own hands to combat piracy both 
individually by increasing maritime patrols and jointly. The most significant of the joint 
efforts was MALSINDO, a trilateral agreement to combat piracy in the Malacca Strait that 
started with coordinated maritime patrols in 2004. Two years later, combined coordinated 
air patrols over the strait, named Eyes in the Sky (EiS), were introduced and the initiative 
was renamed Malacca Straits Patrol Network (Raymond 2010; Liss 2011: 295-6).  
Very few anti-piracy measures went beyond increasing maritime patrols. One 
noteworthy example is ReCAAP,8 the first regional government-to-government agreement 
to address piracy. The initiative was proposed by Japan and aimed at facilitating the sharing 
of piracy-related information. In 2006, ReCAAP came into force and an information 
sharing center was opened in Singapore. However, signing the agreement did not “obligate 
members to any specific action other than sharing information that they deem pertinent to 
imminent piracy attacks” (Bradford 2005: 69).  
In addition to these government responses, some shipowners also hired Private Military 
and Security Companies (PMSCs) to protect their vessels from attacks, primarily in the 
Malaysian and Indonesian waters of the Malacca Strait. This involvement of PMSCs was 
controversial, as both, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments rejected the employment 
of private armed guards in their respective waters. This may have been one reason why the 
employment of such private security firms remained rather limited in Southeast Asia at the 
time (see Liss 2005, 2007). 
8  ReCAAP initially had eight ASEAN members. Today, 19 countries are Contracting Parties: Australia, 
Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, My-
anmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom 
and Vietnam. 
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The government responses to piracy also encountered problems or fell short of 
expectations. For example, the most piracy-prone Southeast Asian countries at the time – 
Malaysia and Indonesia – did not become contracting parties of ReCAAP. Effective control 
of waters in Southeast Asia also remained difficult. Despite the improved capabilities of 
regional naval agencies, many countries still did not have a sufficient number of operational 
vessels and equipment. In addition, corruption within naval forces and the involvement of 
members of armed forces in piracy hampered success. A further obstacle was that 
cooperation between countries in Southeast Asia and between Southeast Asian and other 
nations remained limited. Meaningful cooperation was prevented by factors such as 
contested claims of ownership of islands or maritime space, concerns about sovereignty and 
contending national interests (Mak 2006: 134-62). The most prominent example of limited 
cooperation is the naval patrols conducted as part of the Malacca Straits Patrol Network, 
which remained coordinated rather than joint patrols, meaning that hot pursuit into, and 
patrolling of, waters of neighbouring countries was not permitted (Raymond 2010; Liss 
2011: 295-6). Last but not least, no specific anti-piracy efforts were made to effectively 
address the factors that drove people to piracy – including poverty in coastal communities, 
illegal and overfishing, and a lack of alternative prospects for employment.   
Yet, despite all their shortcomings, the private and government efforts to combat piracy 
showed some localized effect – especially in the Malacca Strait, where the number of re-
ported incidents dropped. With this decline, international interest in Southeast Asian piracy 
began to fade, and when the sharp increase in serious pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden area 
focused world attention firmly on Somali piracy, Asian piracy was all but forgotten. 
3. Contemporary Piracy in Southeast Asia 
3.1 Piracy Re-emerges: Shifts and Changes 
Between 2008 and 2013, international attention focused firmly on Somali piracy. Not only 
did the large number of attacks in the wider Gulf of Aden area cause concern, but also the 
serious nature of incidents and the substantial costs for shipowners and insurance 
companies affected. Somali pirates attacked vessels of all types and nationality, ranging from 
fishing boats and yachts to UN supply ships and supertankers. Unlike the pirates in 
Southeast Asia, Somali pirates have hijacked a large number of ships and held them and the 
crew on board for ransom. A World Bank study estimates that between April 2005 and 
December 2012, 179 ships were hijacked by Somali pirates and that they collected between 
US$ 339 million and US$ 413 million in ransom during this time (World Bank 2013: 1-4). 
As the number of attacks and the ransoms paid increased, nations from around the world 
began to deploy warships to combat piracy in these “pirate-infested” waters. Many of these 
vessels are part of missions sanctioned or organized by multilateral organizations, including 
NATO and the EU (Ehrhart/Petretto/Schneider 2010: 40-5). In addition, shipowners began 
to hire armed PMSC guards to protect their vessels. All these efforts showed success and the 
number of attacks began to decline drastically. In 2013, only two hijackings by Somali 
pirates were reported, and both targeted vessels were released within a day (ICC 2014c: 20). 
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In light of the attacks in the wider Gulf of Aden Area, piracy in Southeast Asia had been 
put on the back burner. However, after the publication of the 2013 IMB piracy statistics 
which showed that Southeast Asia was again the most pirate-prone region and a spate of 
attacks on tankers in 2014, piracy in Southeast Asia was back in the news. Headlines such as 
“Southeast Asia still worst for pirates despite high-profile Somali attacks” (Bartlett 2013: 
n.p.) in The Australian and the Deutsche Welle’s “‘Worrying’ rise in piracy attacks around 
Malacca Strait” are only two examples (Mateus 2014: n.p.). Clearly, piracy in Southeast Asia 
had never entirely disappeared, with incidents still reported from the region. Tables 2 (IMB 
data) and 3 (ReCAAP data), however, both indicate that the number of attacks in Southeast 
Asia declined between 2005 and 2009, with the IMB recording a drop from 168 attacks in 
the region in 2004 to 188 in 2005, 88 in 2006, 80 in 2007 and 65 in 2008. In 2009, the 
number off attacks slowly began to rise again, with 67 incidents reported in 2009 and then 
jumping to 113 incidents the following year.  
Both the IMB and ReCAAP reports indicate that as in the past, the vast majority of 
incidents today are simple hit-and-run robberies; that both opportunistic pirates and 
organized pirate gangs are still responsible for attacks; and that the targets predominantly 
target smaller merchant vessels. Unlike in Somalia, no attacks on large vessels such as 
supertankers are reported from the region. The motivation of pirates has not changed 
either, with poverty, overfishing and unemployment still persistent in some coastal 
communities. Some of the “older” pirates who searched for legal income have even returned 
to piracy. As the piracy expert Eric Frécon (2014: n.p.) writes:  
Former and prospective pirates still exist, waiting among the taxi boats […] (on Batam Island, 
Riau Archipelago). They may have done their best to find safer and more respectable jobs. 
Twenty years after the upsurge of piracy in the early 1990s, and now in their 40s, former 
pirates may no longer be keen to attack ships at night. But many have not got what they 
expected in their new professions. The resulting bitterness and the persistently high 
unemployment rate have pushed them back into illegal activity. Many former pirate chiefs 
returned to the Riau Islands after short retirements.  
Overall, piracy in Southeast Asia has therefore changed little in nature from piracy in the 
late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Yet, the IMB and ReCAAP reports also indicate that small, but 
significant changes have occurred: the location of some piracy hotspots has shifted and 
spates of attacks on specific types of vessels, such as tugs and barges, have been reported. 
Most significant in the period between the mid-2000s and the present are the decline of re-
ported attacks in the Malacca Strait and the shift of pirate activity into the Singapore Strait 
and South China Sea and the re-emergence of Indonesia as the most pirate-prone country 
in the world. However, the IMB and ReCAAP statistics also have their limits. As will be 
explained later, under-reporting of attacks in Southeast Asia is at present suspected to be 
even higher than in the late 1990s/early 2000s, and attacks on smaller vessels are still seldom 
included. The continuation of violent attacks in the Sulu Sea is therefore not reflected in the 
statistics. The following section will discuss piracy in the three current hotspots: (1) the 
Malacca and Singapore Straits and South China Sea, (2) Indonesian waters, and (3) the Sulu 
Sea. 
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Table 2: IMB Statistics: Actual and Attempted Attacks 
IMB Data ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 
Indonesia 93 79 50 43 28 15 40 46 81 106 
Malaysia 9 3 10 9 10 16 18 16 12 9 
Malacca Strait 37 12 11 7 2 2 2 1 2 1 
Singapore Strait 8 7 5 3 6 9 3 11 6 9 
South China Sea 8 6 1 3 0 13 31 13 2 4 
Philippines 4 0 6 6 7 1 5 5 3 3 
Thailand 4 1 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 
Southeast Asia  168 118 88 80 65 67 113 102 110 141 
World 329 276 239 263 293 410 445 439 297 264 
Table 3: ReCAAP ISC Piracy Statistics: Actual and Attempted Attacks 
ReCAAP 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Indonesia 87 72 49 40 25 20 47 49 72 90 
Malaysia 9 2 11 8 13 15 18 17 11 6 
Straits Malacca/ 
Singapore 43 16 13 7 11 9 8 26 13 12 
South China Sea 15 9 3 6 7 13 25 18 7 11 
Philippines 5 0 5 6 8 5 5 6 3 5 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 
Thailand (incl. Gulf) 4 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 
Southeast-Asia 166 110 85 73 73 72 120 128 111 133 
SE-Asia: Gulf of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South China Sea, 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
Source: ReCAAP ISC, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, Annual Reports 2006-2013. 
3.2 Hotspots: Malacca and Singapore Straits and the South China Sea  
The IMB data shows that the number of pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait began to decline 
from 2004 onwards (see Graph 1 and Table 2), with only one or two reported incidents per 
year between 2008 and 2013.9 These, however, have included more serious attacks in recent 
years, often with fishing boats as targets. An example is the hijacking of a Malaysian fishing 
boat on 7 May 2013. The armed pirates took the fishing boat into Indonesian waters where 
it was discovered and detained by the Indonesian authorities on 25 May 2013 (ICC 2014c: 
25-6).  
9  ReCAAP data, which combines attacks conducted in the Malacca and Singapore straits, also confirms that 
the number of reported incidents in this area remained low, at least until 2011 (see Table 3). 
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Graph 1: Number of pirate attacks 
 
The introduction of countermeasures by the littoral states, such as the Malacca Straits Patrol 
Network, can at least in part explain the drop in reported incidents in the Malacca Strait. 
Another contributing factor was the 2005 peace agreement between the Indonesian 
government and the GAM, which ended hijackings and abductions of crew members for 
ransom associated with the conflict in Aceh. Furthermore, many shipowners became more 
reluctant to report minor incidents in the Malacca Strait for financial reasons. In June 2005, 
when the number of reported incidents was already on the decline, the Joint War 
Committee – a body that includes the Lloyds Market Association and the International 
Underwriting Association – made the decision to include the Malacca Strait in its Hull War, 
Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils list. As a result, ships passing through the strait had to 
pay a higher insurance premium (Liss 2011: 344). Even though the strait was removed from 
the list the following year, shipowners remain reluctant to report minor attacks to avoid a 
reversal of that decision. Furthermore, minor incidents in the Malacca Strait, as well as in 
the Singapore Strait and the southern South China Sea, are often not reported because the 
victims believe that local authorities are themselves responsible for attacks (T.B. 2014: 5).  
Another reason for the decline of attacks in the Malacca Strait is that pirates shifted their 
operations to less patrolled waters, especially to the Singapore Strait and the waters of the 
southern South China Sea, just east of the Malacca Strait (see Graph 1). From 2009, an 
elevated level of attacks has therefore been reported in these areas, with the waters between 
the east coast of Peninsula Malaysia and the Indonesian Anambas Islands (near Natunas 
Island on the map) particularly affected. Indonesian pirate gangs based in the Riau 
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Archipelago and the Anambas Islands are believed to be responsible for the attacks, with 
some of the groups also involved in other illegal activities, especially smuggling. The attacks 
conducted by these perpetrators include robberies of vessels in ports, at anchor and in 
transit. The pirates are usually armed, but many gangs only carry one firearm and still rely 
mainly on long knives (Hoesslin 2012: 545-6).  
In the waters of the Singapore Strait and the South China Sea, more serious attacks are 
also recorded and changes in the target selection and the modus operandi of pirates could 
be observed. One change is the focus on tugs and barges, which have become preferred 
targets of pirates, especially between 2008 and 2012. These vessels are generally easier prey 
than merchant vessels. They are easier to board because they have a low freeboard, travel 
slowly (eight to ten knots), and carry a small crew. Furthermore, the cargo of these vessels 
typically consists of palm oil, timber, or other commodities that are valuable, easily 
disposable and difficult to trace, and the vessels themselves can be hidden or sold without 
too many difficulties. Attacks on tugs and barges include straightforward robberies, such as 
the attack on a Singaporean tug boat pulling a barge from Thailand to Indonesia on 9 June 
2013. In that incident, six armed robbers climbed on board in Malaysian waters and forced 
the crew to pump fuel from the tug into a fishing boat. The perpetrators then tied up the 
crew, stole their belongings and other valuables and escaped in a white speedboat (ReCAAP 
2014: 61).  
Tugs and barges have also become preferred hijacking targets. It is suspected that the 
perpetrators have prior knowledge of the targeted vessels, and once the ships are hijacked 
they are taken to a shipyard for refurbishment before being delivered to a pre-arranged 
buyer.10 Several of the stolen tugs and barges taken in recent years have been refurbished 
and sold in the Philippines. An example is the hijacking of the tug Solid 8 and the barge 
Solid 66, on 25 May 2011 about 27 nautical miles southeast of the Indonesian island Pulau 
Subi Besar in the South China Sea. Twelve masked and armed pirates attacked the boats, 
overpowered the crew and placed them in a life raft. After losing contact with the vessels, 
the ship operator notified the Malaysian authorities, who began the search for the vessels. 
While the crew was rescued by Vietnamese fishermen, Malaysian authorities found the 
barge with its cargo intact near the Spratly Islands on 2 June. Six months later, the 
Philippine coast guard was directed to an abandoned tug boat named Vela-I, which was 
later identified as the missing tug Solid 8 (ReCAAP 2012: 82). As in this example, many of 
the hijacked tugs and barges were eventually found, and in some cases authorities were able 
to arrest the perpetrators. 
The second ‘new trend’ is the re-emergence of attacks on tankers in which (parts of) the 
cargo is siphoned off. Most of these incidents took place in the South China Sea, or more 
precisely in the waters near Indonesia’s Riau Archipelago and the waters off Sarawak, east 
10  See: ReCAAP and Information Fusion Centre, Tug Boats and Barges (TaB) Guide. Against Piracy and Sea 
Robbery, Information Sharing Centre, Singapore, n.d. 
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Malaysia. Many of the hijackings followed a similar modus operandi: The perpetrators 
slipped onboard, held the crew hostage, and siphoned off the diesel or gas oil into a large 
bunker barge or a small tanker before leaving the vessel. The crew is mostly left unharmed 
in these incidents (ICC 2014a: n.p.; Rahmat 2014: n.p.). At least six such incidents occurred 
between April and June 2014, with the attack on the Ai Maru and the Moresby 9 
 described earlier in this report being two examples. In some of these incidents, collusion 
between the pirates and crewmembers and/or the shipowner has been suspected. It has, for 
example, been suggested that some of these ‘attacks’ were incidents in which the crew had 
agreed to the fuel transfer in advance, but too much of the cargo was taken to hide the theft. 
As a result the incident was reported as a pirate attack. Such collusion between the crew and 
organized crime groups buying fuel are common practice in some areas of the South China 
Sea (T.B. 2014: 5-7). However, whether or not the crew was involved, the perpetrators need 
the organization, resources and contacts to conduct such attacks and sell the stolen cargo. 
While the attacks in the southern China Sea and the Singapore Strait should not cause 
undue panic, they should be taken seriously. First of all, actual pirate attacks are dangerous 
for the crew, who risk injury and have to fend for themselves when abandoned at sea in a 
small boat by hijackers. Short-term hijackings and the illegal ship-to-ship transfers of oil by 
pirates can also result in ship accidents and environmental problems, such as oil spills. 
Furthermore, the attacks are an indicator of the operations of organized criminals and the 
corruption of officials, which threatens good governance, undermines the rule of law and 
the safety of shipping lanes on which the global economy depends. 
3.3 Hotspot: Indonesia11 
In the late 1990s/early 2000s, Indonesia was the country with the most reported incidents in 
the world. As was the case with attacks in the Malacca Strait, the number of reported 
incidents in Indonesia declined between 2004 and 2009, with only 15 reported actual and 
attempted incidents recorded in 2009 by the IMB (see Graph 2 and 3 and Table 2). From 
2010, however, the number of incidents increased again, with 106 reported attacks in 
2013.12 While the number of attacks has not yet reached the peak of earlier years – 121 
reported incidents in 2003 – Indonesia is currently again the country with the most 
reported pirate attacks in the world. However, most of the attacks occur in ports and are 
minor robberies. The Indonesian case therefore shows that it is important to look not only 
at the number of reported attacks but also at the nature of incidents, in order to avoid 
exaggerating the threat of piracy. 
11  Many of the pirates responsible for attacks in the Singapore and Malacca Straits and the South China Sea 
operate from Indonesia, and these attacks are not included in the Indonesian statistics (even though some 
of these attacks, for example in the Malacca Strait, have taken place in Indonesian waters). 
12  The vast majority of reported incidents are actual, not attempted attacks.  
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Graph 2: Number of attacks 
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In Indonesia, the vast majority of attacks are simple hit-and-run robberies conducted while 
the targeted vessel is at berth or anchor. Attacks reported in 2013 are a good example. In 
that year 106 incidents were reported, of which 97 were actual attacks. Of these 97, eight 
attacks occurred while the target vessel was at berth, 82 while at anchor and in only seven 
incidents was a moving vessel attacked. All the attempted attacks targeted ships at anchor 
(ICC 2014c: 9-10). Indonesian ports, rather than waters, are therefore the most pirate-
prone. The affected ports are located in different parts of Indonesia and include Tanjung 
Priok (Jakarta, Java), Dumai, Belawan (Sumatra), Balikpapan and Samarinda (Kalimantan). 
Many of the attacks in ports occur at night, under cover of darkness. The pirates are often 
armed either with guns, knives or machetes and take small items of value, such as ship’s 
stores, spare parts for engines, ropes and paint (ICC 2014c: 21). When the pirates are 
noticed by the crew and the alarm is raised, the pirates usually flee, with or without booty. 
As these attacks are often not serious in nature and the financial losses small, they are often 
not reported. In 2013, no attacks on Indonesian flagged vessels were reported, and this 
might indicate that pirates avoid Indonesian vessels or, more probably, that Indonesian 
owners do not see any benefit in reporting such minor incidents. 
An example of a typical incident is the robbery of the Chemical Tanker Siteam Neptun, 
on 1 February 2012 at Batam Outer Anchorage (Riau Archipelago). During the night, the 
pirates slipped on board, stole ship’s stores and left the vessel without being seen (ICC 2013: 
38). While most attacks follow this scheme, some have an interesting twist. In the case of the 
attack on the chemical tanker Maersk Bering on 6 April 2013 in the port of Belawan (on the 
Indonesian side of the Malacca Strait), for example, the pirates contacted the master of the 
ship after the robbery through an agent and offered to sell the stolen goods back to him 
(ICC 2014c: 37). Rarer are incidents in which the crew is confronted by the perpetrators. 
One such incident is the attack on the Turkish bulk carrier Ince Inebolu at Adang Bay 
Anchorage, Kalimantan, Makassar Strait. On 6 February 2013, three pirates armed with 
knives climbed on board the ship via the anchor chain and attacked the duty officer, who 
was able to escape and raise the alarm. When the crew mustered, the pirates fled with some 
ship’s stores (ICC 2014c: 34). 
3.4 Hotspot: The Sulu Sea Area 
As in earlier years, the level of pirate attacks in the Sulu Sea is not reflected in the IMB’s 
(and ReCAAP’s) statistics. In this area, little seems to have changed over the years in regard 
to attacks on merchant and fishing vessels, even though Malaysian government agencies 
made substantive efforts to increase maritime and border security. As in the past, attacks on 
larger vessels are seldom reported from the Sulu Sea, and those reported are predominantly 
minor incidents. Among the attacks on merchant ships included in the annual ReCAAP 
reports in recent years are several minor robberies in the port of Sandakan, north-eastern 
Sabah. On 28 January 2012, for instance, four pirates armed with knives boarded a chemical 
tanker at anchor. The watch spotted the perpetrators who fled when the alarm was raised 
(ReCAAP 2013: 42). The pirates were more successful in two other robberies in October 
and November 2011, in which a tug and a chemical tanker were targeted. In these incidents 
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the perpetrators were able to escape with small items such as batteries, an emergency pump 
and ship’s stores (ReCAAP 2012: 96, 100).  
A few attempted attacks on larger vessels were also reported from the Sulu Sea and the 
neighbouring Celebes Sea. On 14 October 2011, for example, a bulk carrier was chased by 
six pirate boats in the Sulu Sea, but the perpetrators aborted the attack when the crew 
implemented anti-piracy measures, including the use of fire hoses. Two months later, 
another bulk carrier was targeted in the Celebes Sea. The pirates in this incident attempted 
to climb on board the ship but were also unsuccessful due to anti-piracy measures 
employed by the crew (ReCAAP 2012: 110). Occasionally, tugs and barges are also targeted 
in the Sulu Sea. Among those attacked in this area were the tug Woodman 38 and barge 
Woodman 39. The two vessels were reported missing in July 2012 after contact with the 
ships was lost between Kadut and Pulau Banggi, Sabah. On 31 July, the crew was spotted on 
two inflatable rafts and was rescued by the Philippine authorities. On the same day, the two 
vessels were discovered drifting off the southern tip of Mindanao, southern Philippines. Six 
men were found on board Woodman 38 but escaped (ReCAAP 2013: 56). 
As in the past, most attacks in the Sulu area today target smaller vessels and these 
incidents remain underreported. Fishermen and their boats are still favoured targets of 
pirates and frequently suffer at the hands of violent perpetrators. In August 2013, for 
example, a group of armed men held nine fishermen hostage for several hours in the waters 
off Semporna, Sabah (near Sipadan on the map). Following the incident, Sabah police stated 
that they had identified two foreign-based pirate gangs responsible for attacks on fishers in 
Malaysian waters (Borneo Insider 2013b: n.p.). Despite this, attacks did not cease. On 
Christmas Day 2013, for instance, eight fishermen were executed off Mindanao, southern 
Philippines. The victims, who included two teenage boys, had been among eleven Bajao 
fishermen who went on a fishing voyage on three boats. They were shot and beheaded and 
their tied-up bodies were found aboard a drifting boat in early January 2014. It remains 
unclear who was responsible for the attack or what triggered the excessive violence (ABC 
News 2014: n.p. Pareño 2014: n.p.). Violent attacks also continue to occur in 2014. In June, 
for example, a fishing boat was fired upon by unidentified gunmen off Zamboanga Del Sur, 
Mindanao. One of the two fishers on board jumped overboard and escaped. The fishing 
boat was later discovered by the Philippine coast guard – with the body of the second fisher 
still on board (ICC 2014b: n.p.). 
While attacks on fishing boats never abated, kidnappings and raids on towns in Sabah 
organised and conducted from the southern Philippines, which occurred periodically in the 
past, seemed to have stopped after the Sipadan kidnapping in 2000.13 Since 2010, however, a 
spate of raids on towns and offshore businesses in Sabah has again caused concern. As in 
the past, the perpetrators generally operate from the southern Philippines and use small 
13  Kidnappings within the Philippines, however, continued to occur and in some of these incidents boats 
were used. Kidnapping remains a serious problem in the Philippines.  
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boats for their attacks. One of the first of the recent spate of incidents was the 2010 
kidnapping for ransom of two employees of a seaweed plantation off the coast of Semporna. 
In November 2012 the abduction of two cousins from an estate near Lahad Datu north of 
Semporna followed. The victims were taken to the Philippines where one of them died, 
while the other was able to escape after almost nine months in captivity. A few days after the 
kidnapping, gunmen attacked the settlement of Kampung Indra Sabah and departed with “a 
few hundred ringgit worth of anchovies” (Queville To 2012: n.p.; Star 2013: n.p.). 
Another incident occurred near Lahad Datu, starting in February 2013, and this incident 
differed somewhat in nature from simple raids, pirate attacks or kidnappings. In this event, 
the perpetrators also came by boat and their weapons were smuggled into Malaysia by ship 
– but unlike other raids, the perpetrators in this case first began to settle in the area before 
violence broke out. The perpetrators were an estimated 200 men belonging to the Royal 
Security Forces of the Sulu Sultanate, who were allegedly sent by Jamalul Kiram III, one of 
several claimants to the title of Sultan of Sulu, and led by his brother Abgimuddin Kiram. 
The group’s main objective was reportedly to reinforce the Sulu Sultanate’s (and/or 
Philippine) claim to Sabah, which was leased by the Sulu Sultanate to the British North 
Borneo Company in 1878.14 After weeks of calm, in which the Malaysian government 
negotiated with the group, violence erupted when the militants refused to leave. The clashes 
between the government and the gunmen caused casualties on both sides and were serious 
in nature. The Malaysian government bombed the area where the militants were hiding 
(Felongco 2013: n.p.; interviews by author 2013) and Malaysian police used violence and 
intimidation15 in their search for suspected supporters of “Sultan” Jamalul Kiram III. In 
these searches, little difference was made between long-term and short-term residents and 
those with and without permission to stay in Sabah (interviews by author). The standoff was 
eventually resolved and some of the gunmen and their alleged associates are currently on 
trial. However, many details about the incident and government responses remain some-
what hazy.  
Following the standoff in Lahad Datu, yet another new agency, the Eastern Sabah 
Security Command (Esscom) was established in April 2013 to strengthen maritime and 
border security in Sabah.16 Esscom will be working alongside agencies such as the Royal 
Malaysian Police, the Marine Police, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, the 
navy and air force. Yet, despite the formation of Esscom, on 15 November 2013, armed 
14  Other motivations allegedly included the “exclusion of other rebel and religious groups from peace talks 
with the Benigno III administration and the withdrawal of Malaysian support for Sulu and the MNLF” 
(Nocos 2013: n.p.). 
15  While Malaysia denied it, reports of human rights abuses by Malaysian forces emerged, including killings, 
beatings and the destruction of ID cards. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs stated that it 
would attempt to document and validate these reports. (Alipala/Manlupig 2013: n.p. Punongbayan/Flores 
2013: n. p.). 
16  In addition to an increase in personnel, including military and police officers, the establishment of more 
General Operation Force (GOF) bases is planned. 
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raiders targeted the Pom Pom island resort (30 km North East of Semporna), which is 
situated less than a kilometre away from a General Operation Force base. In this event, 
armed gunmen allegedly belonging to the Abu Sayyaf approached the island by boat, raided 
three tourist villas, killed a Taiwanese holidaymaker and kidnapped his wife. The woman 
was taken to Jolo Island, southern Philippines, and was freed after 36 days after a ransom of 
reportedly US$ 300,000 had been paid (New Straits Time 2013: n.p.). 
In 2014, kidnappings continued unabated – with at least four incidents reported up until 
July this year. On 2 April a Chinese tourist and a resort worker were taken from the 
Singamata Reef Resort near Semporna by armed men from the southern Philippines. In 
May a Chinese fish farm manager was kidnapped, and in mid-June a fish farm owner and 
one of his employees were abducted. All victims were taken to the southern Philippines and, 
while the Chinese fish farm manager was rescued in early July, the fate of the other victims 
remains unknown (Star 2014: n.p.; New Straits Times 2014: n.p.; Goh 2014 a, b: n.p.) The 
latest incident occurred on 12 July 2014 when two marine policemen ran into eight armed 
men attacking a resort on Mabul Island near Semporna. One of the policemen was killed in 
a shootout with the perpetrators, while the other was kidnapped. Following the incident, the 
Malaysian Navy requested that security forces protecting Sabah should be allowed to “shoot 
on sight” at any suspicious target encroaching upon Malaysian waters (Dermawan 2014: 
n.p.).   
Unlike in other parts of Southeast Asia, in Sabah piracy and, even more strongly, 
maritime raids have a measurable economic and political impact. Among the hardest hit 
economically is the local maritime tourism industry, which is an important source of 
income in east Malaysia. The raids and kidnappings spread fear among tourists and several 
governments, including the UK government, have recently issued travel warnings for 
coastal Sabah, advising “against all but essential travel” to the area (Gov. UK 2014: n.p.). 
Similarly, the violence and abductions make it more difficult for locals to find investors for 
offshore businesses such as seaweed plantations and fish farms (Interviews by author, Sabah 
2013). 
The violent pirate attacks and raids have also triggered political debates, especially 
because the perpetrators are mostly from the southern Philippines. It is unfortunate that the 
discussions of raids and attacks are frequently linked to the very prominent and contentious 
debate about “illegal” immigrants in Sabah – as a large number of them are also from the 
Philippines. The incidents are utilised in this context to promote stronger measures against 
(illegal) migrants. Especially vocal are opposition politicians, who criticise government 
policies that facilitate the influx of foreigners and the strategic granting of citizenship. Such 
politicians have spoken of a foreign “monster” that needs to be destroyed,17 have demanded 
that authorities “should stop all those entries into Sabah, not only pirates, but also people 
17  STAR (State Reform Party) Sabah Chief Datuk Jeffrey Kitingan following the 2014 raid on Pulau Mabul.  
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who are seeking citizenship”18 and suggested that the “houses of illegal squatters in all the 
islands and the coastal areas should be demolished.”19 (Malay Mail Online 2013: n.p.). 
Support for strong action against squatters and illegal immigrants is also reflected in 
government policies and the responses of security forces to attacks, such as the response to 
the standoff in Lahad Datu.  
A further point of contention in Sabah is the ongoing failure of the various government 
forces to secure Sabah waters and the question of who is involved in plotting the incidents. 
For example, after the Lahad Datu standoff, Defence Minister Datuk Hishammudin 
Hussein stated that three opposition leaders, two from peninsular Malaysia and one from 
Sabah, were involved in the plot. Among the accused was opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, 
but the claims were never substantiated (Borneo Insider 2013a: n.p.).20 Opposition parties 
on the other hand have used the failure of government forces as a reason for demanding the 
resignation of those responsible for maritime security. The Defence Minister and the 
Minister of Home Affairs were, for instance, asked to resign after the raid on Pom Pom 
Island (Malay Mail Online 2013: n.p.). 
4. Conclusion: Responses to Piracy – The Way Forward 
Surprisingly little has changed in the nature of pirate attacks in Southeast Asia between the 
late 1990s/early 2000s and the present, despite the shift of attacks from the Malacca Strait to 
the southern South China Sea and the (re-)emergence of some trends, such as the attacks on 
tankers. While piracy statistics provide some valuable insights, the discussion above has 
shown that they can also be misleading. In Southeast Asia, the statistics, for example, inflate 
the piracy problem in Indonesia, while at the same time underrepresenting attacks in the 
Sulu Sea. The closer look at attacks in the three Southeast Asian hotspots has also revealed 
that the nature of attacks differs in the three waters areas. In Indonesia, incidents are mostly 
thefts in ports. In the Sulu Sea, smaller vessels are the primary target of often violent 
perpetrators, and maritime raids occur. In the Singapore Straits and southern South China 
Sea, tugs, barges and tankers are attacked by organized criminal gangs. To combat piracy in 
Southeast Asia, tailored responses to the different kinds of incident are needed, as well as 
efforts to address the root causes of piracy which facilitate piracy in all areas. The latter 
include corruption, limited cooperation between government agencies, poverty and 
overfishing. Both the tailored and broader responses are necessary to prevent piracy from 
18  Darell Leiking, Panempang MP, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People's Justice Party, PKR), after the raid on 
Pom Pom Island. 
19  Jimmy Wong from the Democratic Action party after the raid on Pom Pom Island. 
20  Some family members of people involved in opposition politics in Sabah were also arrested after the 
stand-off. They were interrogated about their own role and the involvement of others, including opposi-
tion leader Anwar Ibrahim (Author’s Interview with a family member of an arrested resident, 2013). 
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escalating in Southeast Asia, to protect future victims (especially seafarers and fishers), and 
to ensure that regional shipping lanes remain safe for trade.  
4.1 Tailored Responses  
Efforts tailored to preventing specific kinds of attack, or attacks that occur in specific water 
areas are necessary to reduce piracy. To be successful, not only governments but also non-
state actors need to be involved. The shipping industry is one example, as shipowners could 
increase their efforts to ensure that crews are aware of high-risk areas; that sufficient 
manpower is on board to conduct effective piracy watches; and that appropriate security 
procedures and equipment are in place. While this applies to all merchant vessels, special 
efforts have to be made to secure tugs and barges, as they are particularly vulnerable. For 
these vessels, ReCAAP (n.d), for instance, recommends sufficient lighting around ships, the 
installation of tracking devices and alarm systems, and when high value cargo is being 
transported the use of barbed wire around the vessels to prevent easy access. Governments 
could support these efforts by further improving response time to attacks and strengthening 
cooperation to prevent or foil attacks. Police presence could also be increased in areas such 
as the Anambas Islands, from which pirates are known to operate and where police 
presence is sparse (T.B. 2014: 7). 
Tailored action could also assist in preventing the recent spate of attacks on oil tankers, 
in which the cargo is siphoned off and sold on the booming black market. Facilitated by oil 
subsidies in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia and the involvement of corrupt 
officials, oil smuggling in Southeast Asia is lucrative, with oil from Malaysia and Indonesia, 
for example, transshipped through Singapore and sold in the Philippines or China. Pirates 
and their sponsors take advantage of this readily available black market. Eliminating this 
opportunity to sell stolen goods would adversely affect pirates. Like piracy, however, oil 
smuggling is difficult to stop and requires regional (or international) cooperation. While 
some efforts have been made to combat oil smuggling, more substantial steps are needed. 
Options include targeted efforts to combat organized crime (including measures against the 
organisers and financiers of illegal activities), and the establishment of an ASEAN 
monitoring group, as suggested by Philippine Senator Osmeña in 2013 (Cabacungan 2013: 
n.p.).  
Different efforts are needed to combat piracy in Indonesian waters, where mostly vessels 
at anchor or in berths are targeted. Improving port security is therefore vital. As the 
following example of the port of Belawan demonstrates, it is not necessarily a lack of 
security personnel that allows security breaches in Indonesian ports. Port security has been 
the responsibility of the police since 2004, but today there is a wide range of different state 
agencies active in the port of Belawan, including the navy, customs, immigration, and the 
Polairud (special police for water and airspace). In addition, different private or semi-
private actors provide security in the port, including PMSCs, and members of Pemuda 
Pancasila, a paramilitary organisation infamous, among other things, for its violent support 
of Suharto’s military coup in 1965 and its involvement in illegal activities. That pirates and 
other criminals are able to operate in the port despite the presence of all these security 
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providers is in part due to the lack of coordination and cooperation between the different 
security providers. Furthermore, some of the security providers are known to turn a blind 
eye in exchange for bribes, and members of the Pemuda Pancasila have been involved in 
illegal activities in the very port they are hired to protect (see Sciascia 2013: 163-187). Until 
the role of the different agencies in this and other ports is clarified, cooperation and 
professionalism improved, corruption actively fought and security personnel chosen more 
carefully, piracy and other illegal activities will continue to flourish in Indonesian ports.  
Addressing piracy and maritime raids in the Sulu Sea area also requires targeted efforts. 
Ending piracy in these waters is of particular importance. Not only are attacks in this area 
often very violent in nature, with serious injury, abductions and the killing of victims still 
common, but they also have serious economic and political consequences. Despite the long 
history of extensive social, political and economic exchanges between people in the area, the 
attacks and raids polarise the population, spread fear and harm local businesses. The at 
times violent government responses to raids also have an adverse effect on relationships 
between people from Sabah and the southern Philippines – especially because problems 
such as illegal migration and economic inequalities are already at the forefront. The raids 
and attacks and ensuing government responses clearly increase tensions in an already 
volatile political and social environment. 
To combat piracy and prevent maritime raids, the efforts of the Malaysian and 
Philippine government agencies to secure the waters and borders of the Sulu Sea are crucial, 
even though they have so far failed to address these problems. However, on the Malaysian 
side, the establishment of more maritime agencies is unlikely to help. Unduly violent 
responses by government forces, such as the “shoot on sight” policy, are also not beneficial. 
Shooting on sight at any suspicious looking vessel is problematic in waters such as the Sulu 
Sea, because of the sheer number of small vessels plying these waters, including fishing 
boats, transport ships, taxi boats and small passenger ferries. Many of the small boats carry 
firearms for defensive purposes, as these waters are known to be dangerous. Simply 
shooting at a suspicious vessel is therefore likely to put the lives of civilians at risk. What is 
important is to ensure that the existing agencies have the manpower, training, 
professionalism and appropriate equipment to effectively secure Sabah waters. Similarly, in 
the Philippines corruption within security forces needs to be addressed and suitable 
equipment such as small, fast patrol boats needs to be provided. Closer cooperation between 
the Malaysian and Philippine forces would also make a difference. Especially in this area, 
allowing the hot pursuit of perpetrators into a neighbouring country’s water could make 
operations of pirates and maritime raiders more difficult.   
Ending the conflict in the southern Philippines would also decrease attacks and violence 
in the Sulu Sea. The southern Philippines are awash with weapons, which can readily be 
used by pirates and raiders and contribute to the high level of violence in pirate attacks. 
Indeed, the violent pirate attacks and raids can be seen as a spillover from the violent 
conflict in the southern Philippines. The close connection between the conflict in the 
southern Philippines and pirate attacks and raids is highlighted by the blurring of political 
and criminal motivations of perpetrators, who include, for example, members of the Abu 
Sayyaf. Unfortunately, ending the conflict in the southern Philippines is a difficult task, even 
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though the MILF, the largest of the armed separatist groups, and the Philippine government 
signed a peace agreement in March 2014. It includes an agreement to disarm MILF fighters 
and an addendum on Bangsamoro waters (Guardian 2014: n.p.; Office of the President of 
the Philippines 2014: n.p.). While this is an important step forward, the implementation of 
the agreement will be problematic and in addition to the MILF, other armed groups such as 
the Abu Sayyaf will continue to be active. 
4.2 Broad Responses – Root Causes  
In addition to the tailored responses discussed above, broader initiatives that target the root 
causes of piracy are also necessary to eliminate it. Addressing the root causes of piracy is, 
however, a difficult task, as deep-seated problems need to be addressed. The root causes 
include factors that drive individuals to become pirates, such as poverty, overfishing and 
illegal fishing, as well as other factors that facilitate piracy. These include corruption of law 
enforcement agencies or individuals serving in them and limited cooperation between 
countries to combat piracy. For example, sensitivities about sovereignty still prevent states 
in Southeast Asia from allowing hot pursuit of pirates into another country’s waters. 
Similarly, maritime patrols remain coordinated rather than joint patrols, and Malaysia and 
Indonesia are still not members of ReCAAP.  
Cooperation is especially important because many of the underlying causes of piracy are 
transnational in nature and also require intergovernmental cooperation and between 
governments and non-state actors such as NGOs. Responses to illegal fishing and 
overfishing, for example, require regional and international cooperation between 
governments, marine conservation organizations and the fishing industry. While such 
regional and international cooperation does exist, efficient efforts to prevent the 
overexploitation of fish stocks have so far had only very limited success – often because 
regulations are not binding or enforcement remains weak or difficult (see Williams 2013: 
258-83). Steps forward would therefore include the establishment of binding regulations, an 
increase in efforts to enforce rules, as well as initiatives to tackle problems such as the use of 
Flag of Convenience registers to avoid regulations and fishing quotas. Additionally, efforts 
are necessary to persuade governments to control the overexploitation of their waters and to 
raise consumer awareness. Generally, cooperative initiatives to address over and illegal 
fishing, as well as other root causes of piracy need to be increased, and binding agreements 
need to be introduced. 
Governments from outside the region can also contribute, and it is here, addressing the 
root causes of piracy, that they should become involved. In Southeast Asia, non-Southeast 
Asian governments can initiate or support programs that aim at eliminating poverty, 
addressing corruption or creating sustainable work opportunities for people along the coast. 
Given the problem of corruption in countries such as the Philippines, support for measures 
which increase the professionalism of local forces could also have a positive effect. A simple 
donation of military hardware or funds as has been done in the past will not make much 
difference. Some of the initiatives to combat Somali piracy may provide ideas. Clearly, the 
deployment of naval forces from around the globe and the use of armed PMSCs guards on 
 
26 Carolin Liss 
 
ships are not necessary to address piracy in Southeast Asia. Broader initiatives that address 
the root causes of Somali piracy, however, could be useful for the Southeast Asian region as 
well. One example is the European Union Programme to Promote Regional Maritime 
Security (MASE), which includes initiatives to boost economic growth and trade in areas 
where pirates are based and operate, as well as programs offering vocational training for 
young men to assist them in finding alternatives to piracy (European Commission 2013: 
n.p.; Frécon 2014: n.p.). However, because these programs have only recently been 
introduced, it is too early to assess whether they are successful and, for example, deter 
young men from joining pirate gangs in the future.  
On the regional and international levels, states from outside Southeast Asia could 
support efforts to address transnational problems such as overfishing and illegal fishing or 
transnational crime. Improvements could also be initiated through the introduction and/or 
enforcement of suitable flag state regulations that ensure that vessels and crews are prepared 
for potential attacks. States should ensure that vessels flying their colours meet sufficient 
safety and security standards; that crew members are sufficiently paid and their working 
conditions are satisfactory (overworked and tired crew cannot perform efficient anti-piracy 
watches); and that the crew knows how to respond to pirate attacks. Achieving these aims is 
difficult especially because many vessels are today registered in so-called Flags of 
Convenience (FOC) countries, such as Liberia, Cambodia or Mongolia, known for their lax 
regulations and the slow implementation of international safety and security standards. 
Here, the shipping and fishing industries clearly need to become involved.  
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Map 1.1: East and Southeast Asia' first appeared in Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy and 
Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh by Carolin Liss (2011), p. 30. 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the publisher, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore <https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg> 
Map 1.1: East and Southeast Asia 
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